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CHINA'S FOREIGN AID IN 1978 
By JOHN FRANKLIN COPPER 
I. Introduction 
The year 1978 witnessed a number of important changes and 
firsts in China's foreign aid program. Most important was the 
cutting of aid to China's heretofore largest recipients: Vietnam 
and Albania. In this connection it was reported in mid-year that 
China's populace welcomed the end of aid to these two countries 
and that China's foreign economic assistance was unpopular 
domestically.1 Late in the year a wall poster was seen in Peking 
(Beijing) which read: "While people were begging in the streets in 
some parts of China, the dictator of our country distributed 
Chinese money to his fellow dictators in Vietnam and Albania."2 
It was reported officially in the fall that China was cutting its 
foreign aid program drastically and that the present level of aid 
giving was about one-tenth that of 1970. This same source also 
stated that China needed the resources that previously went into 
the foreign aid program and that the program had not brought 
sufficient political dividends.3 At almost the same time the Prime 
Minister of Papua New Guinea, after approaching China for aid, 
admitted his disappointment at being told that "China now has a 
new policy with regard to aid."4 Peking also allegedly answered a 
request from Tanzania for another railroad project and an iron ore 
extraction project by saying that China needed railroad building 
equipment at home and that the two projects suggested were "too 
expensive and not economically feasible." 5 
China requested aid from the United Nations for the first time 
in 1978, while negotiating a number of long-term loans from 
1. David Bonavia, "China Closes Purse as Own House Needs Repair: Move to 
End Aid to Vietnam and Albania Shows Growth of Self-Interest," The Times 
(London), July 24, 1978, p. 5. 
2. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," China Quarterly, January 
1978, p. 187, citing a French news agency report of December 6, 1978. 
3. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," China Quarterly, January 
1979, p. 187, citing a Swedish radio broadcast based upon a report from Hong Kong 
by Rolf Soederbert. 
4. Asia Research Bulletin, December 31, 1979, p. 315. 
5. "Intelligence," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 41, October 13, 
1978, p. 5. 
2 CONTEMIPORY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Western countries.6 Although it appeared contradictory that 
China would solicit aid while continuing to give foreign economic 
assistance, there was no sign that Chinese leaders were troubled 
by this, or that the foreign aid program was to end. Other firsts in 
1978 were praise from the United States for China's foreign aid 
program and an alleged promise by China to give assistance to 
Pakistan to build nuclear reprocessing facilities. 7 
The report that China's aid giving in 1978 was only one-tenth 
of that of 1970 is less startling than it may appear since 1970 was 
the peak year in China's foreign aid program. Official aid given in 
1970 was one hundred times more than the previous year, though 
actual aid given was certainly not that much greater.8 Moreover, 
in 1971 officially reported aid dropped to just over one-third of 
what it had been in 1970. According to Chinese government 
sources, aid worth $121 million was extended in 1978, a figure 
close to the totals of the previous three years (see Table 1). If a $56 
million loan to Mozambique that was renegotiated in 1978 is 
added, the total comes to $177 million, or more than any of the 
previous three years. 
Since official figures are hardly representative of China's aid 
giving efforts, it is necessary to look to other data to make more 
accurate judgments. The elimination of aid to Vietnam and 
Albania clearly resulted in a marked drop in total aid deliveries -
probably by 50 percent or more. On the other hand, China's aid to 
other nations remained about the same or increased. Peking gave 
aid to 53 nations during the year, four more than in 1977 and nine 
more than in 1976 (Table 2). Five nations received aid for the first 
time; seven if Red Cross aid is added (Tables 3 and 4). Two 
6. See Asian Recorder, December 10-16, 1S78, p. 19227. According to this 
source, China was seeking aid, not only through U.N. development programs, but 
also from WHO and UNESCO. The amount China wanted was $100 million, 
according to a U.N. official. 
7. In mid-year President Carter praised China's aid program in the context of 
criticizing Soviet arms aid in Africa. In fact, Carter's National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski urged China to step up its aid in Mrica to serve as a 
counterweight to Soviet aid. See Time, June 5, 1978, p. 10. Concerning China's 
reported offer of aid to Pakistan for nuclear reprocessing facilities, see Asian 
Recorder, October 8-14, 1978, p. 19101, citing an article in the newsletter 
Nucletonics published in New York. . 
8. See John Franklin Copper, China's Foreign Aid: An Instrument of 
Peking's Foreign Policy (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company (1976), pp. 
125-26. 
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nations that had not received aid from China for some time, North 
Korea and Ghana, once again became recipients of China's 
largess. Peking promised or negotiated more than forty new aid 
projects that could be defined as large or medium sized, involving 
more than twenty countries (Table 5). Nine major projects were 
completed during the year, several of which will likely have a 
significant effect on the recipient country's development plans, as 
well as its relations with China (Table 6). 
Owing to China's termination of its aid program to Vietnam 
and Albania, communist countries received about the same 
amount of aid as non-communist Asian countries or African 
countries, in contrast to previous years when communist nations 
received the largest portion of Chinese aid. Middle Eastern 
nations fared much less well, while China extended aid to only 
two nations in Latin America and one in non-communist Europe. 
Kampuchea and Pakistan were China's two largest aid· 
recipients during 1978. The former was almost completely 
dependent upon China's economic assistance for its survival. 
Pakistan received aid from a variety of other sources, making 
China something less than a major donor. Tanzania, in the past a 
major recipient of Chinese aid, was noticeably being weaned from 
Chinese· economic help. In fact, China publically expressed some 
disappointment that it could not break its connections with the 
Tan-Zam Railroad, a railroad line running through Tanzania and 
Zambia, and China's largest aid project anywhere. Chinese 
technicians had to return to help keep the railroad operational 
after it had experienced serious problems that led to some 
questioning in both recipient countries about its value and 
usefulness. This undoubtedly explains why China has given no 
indication, contrary to many observers' expectations, that it 
would undertake another large project like the Tan-Zam Railroad. 
China provided military aid to fewer countries than in the 
past (Table 7). In fact, officially announced military assistance 
was extended only to Kampuchea and Zaire. Aid to guerrilla or 
revolutionary movements was also off, with guerrillas operating 
in Rhodesia, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Meo 
tribes in Laos being the only recipients (Table 8). Most of China's 
assistance to foreign countries went to fmance projects in the 
public sector, but few seemed designed to foster socialism per se. 
Roadbuilding, medical aid, agricultural assistance, textile mills 
and other small factories, and power stations were the most 
popular kinds of aid. China also built a number of stadiums 
' 
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sports complexes and meeting halls. Little aid was given to help 
communist parties or organizations, and almost no food aid was 
given. The sparse information available on aid negotiations 
during the year, together with recipients' comments and attitudes, 
suggest that China still favors giving aid in the form of non-
interest loans with long repayment periods. The grant aspect of 
these loans, however, remains less than Western aid because they 
are repayable in commodities rather than in currency which 
declines in value due to inflation. Also, as in the past, Chinese 
economic aid is given to purchase Chinese goods only. 
Judging from China's foreign aid program in 1978, its motives 
in aid giving remain predominantly political, though its goals 
varied among different nations and regions. In the case of aid to 
non-communist Asian nations, Chinese leaders considered the 
balance of power on the Indian subcontinent to be important to 
Chinese security directly, as well as indirectly by preventing an 
increase in Soviet influence there. In Africa, China's aims in 
giving aid related to winning support for its foreign policy 
objectives and its international views expressed in the United 
Nations. Aid to communist nations can be tied to Sino-Soviet 
differences and to China's bid for ideological leadership of the 
bloc. Aid to Middle Eastern and other nations must be connected 
to more specific goals and to local circumstances. 
China's foreign aid program in 1978, as has been true over the 
past several years, was not in any sense competitive with Western 
aid programs. On the other hand, China actively sought to 
compete with Soviet aid giving, and in several cases either 
terminated aid when its influence diminished and Soviet influence 
increased, or increased aid to countries that were experiencing 
problems with the Kremlin. Peking criticized the Kremlin for 
using aid in exploiting recipient countries and causing them to 
lose their political and economic independence. Specifically 
mentioned was the fact that Soviet aid advisors and technicians 
demand large salaries and much better living conditions than 
those of local citizens, and that their technicians keep secret the 
blueprints for aid projects.9 The fact that Soviet loans carry 
interest and sometimes cannot be repaid and that the repayment 
is tied to the export of raw materials to the Soviet Union were also 
cited. 
9. See "Two Kinds of Aid," Peking Review, No. 33 August 18, 1978, p. 36. 
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In terms of more general foreign policy goals, China's foreign 
aid program seemed to reflect an effort to maintain some measure 
of leadership of Third World countries and win support among 
poor countries for China's foreign policy aims. It also mirrored a 
perspective on the part of Chinese leaders that events in other 
parts of the world affect China - though this attitude did not 
seem to extend to Latin America to any meaningful extent. In the 
context of a larger role in the United Nations and the possibility 
of China's becoming an important recipient of U.N. aid, Peking 
gave evidence of bringing its aid program into line with 
international guidelines. In one case China gave aid under U.N. 
auspices. If this can be regarded as a precedent, it represents a 
major switch from China's policy of giving only bilateral aid. 
Bloc and regional assessments of China's aid during 1978 are 
made in the following sections. Specific aims and events in 
China's aid giving during the year are analyzed, juxtaposed 
beside general objectives and trends. After the bloc and region 
assessments conclusions are made concerning the successes and 
failures of China's aid program during 1978 together with some 
expectations concerning China's future aid giving. 
II. Aid to Communist Countries 
China's aid to communist countries declined significantly in 
1978 owing to the severing of aid to Vietnam and Albania. The 
final decisions in both cases came in mid-year and may, in fact, 
have been connected. Clearly both moves seem related to China's 
own development plans and its need for more investment funds at 
home. On the other hand, there is good evidence to suggest that 
China's aid relations with Vietnam and Albania were based on 
different motives and China had special reasons for breaking its 
aid ties with each. Despite the official termination of its aid to 
these two countries, China continued work on projects almost 
completed and some projects were even finished in these two 
countries during the year (in contrast to the Soviet Union's mode 
of terminating its aid progran1s to China and Albania). 
Kampuchea received· large amounts of Chinese aid, both 
economic and military, and a sizeable contingent of Chinese 
engineers, technicians and laborers were in the country up until 
the time it was overrun by the Vietnamese army. No figures are 
available on the value of Chinese aid to Kampuchea during the 
year, but it is uncontestable that Kampuchea was the largest 
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recipient of Chinese assistance among both communist and non-
communist countries during 1978. And, although the fall of the 
Pol Pot re~me ended the officiarflow orrud and forced Chinese 
personnel to flee, guerrillas operating in the country and units of 
Pol Pot's army that reorganized in Thailand and returned to 
Kampuchea continued to recieve assistance from China. 
Laos continued to benefit from Chinese assistance in 1978, 
and though China appeared to be very active in providing Laos 
with aid during the year, this can probably best be described as a 
holding action or an effort to counteract the growing influence of 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union and their increased aid to Laos. 
China's road-building efforts in upper Laos, which had been going 
on for a number of years, continued to preserve a Chinese sphere 
of influence there. The value of Chinese help to Laos in 1978 is 
difficult to estimate, notwithstanding the fact that Chinese 
leaders had much to say about it during the year. 
China also extended essentially token amounts of aid to 
Romania and North Korea during the year. In March it was 
reported that Chinese workers and technicians were helping to 
build a polycarbonate production unit in Romania. 10 In September 
the government of North Korea announced the completion of a 
large construction project with the help of Chinese technicians. 11 
Kim 11 Sung sent gifts and medals to the Chinese technicians and 
praised their work, suggesting that they were ~id personnel and 
that the project was built in part or entirely with Chinese 
assistance. 
China provided economic aid to Vietnam during the first part 
of the year, though in a very truncated form, as had been true 
during the previous two to three years. Peking probably hoped to 
keep Hanoi from falling completely into the Soviet orbit, even 
though it was clear that Vietnam was siding with Moscow 
regarding Sino-Soviet differences and was becoming heavily 
reliant upon Soviet aid. Early in the year Vietnamese leaders had 
given some cause for thinking that they would not unequivocably 
side with the Russians by requesting Western aid and by pursuing 
better relations with nations of the region that were openly cool to 
the Kremlin's "Asian Security Plan" - which was viewed in 
Peking as a device for "containing" China. In May, however, it 
was reported that China had decided to withdraw its specialists 
10. Agerpress, March 20, 1978, cited in China Aktuell (Hamburg), April 1978, 
p. 9. 
11. Korean Central News Agency, September 6 and 8, 1978. Cited in Ibid., 
October 1978, p. 15. 
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working on 20 projects in Vietnam. The stated reason was that 
China needed the funds to feed large numbers of refugees that 
were being forced to leave Vietnam.12 Subsequently the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry announced that it was cancelling part of its 
"complete factory aid projects" to Vietnam.13 Almost at the same 
time, however, Peking reported that a large oil bunker had been 
built and put into use in Vietnam, stressing that it was part of 
China's aid program to VietnamY Peking apparently wanted to 
give the impression that it was cancelling its aid to Vietnam 
because of Hanoi's actions and sought to avoid the impression 
that it was trying to disrupt Vietnam's economy or was acting 
vindictively. 
In July the Chinese government sent a note to Vietnamese 
officials saying that China "had been compelled" to stop all 
economic and technical aid and that it was recalling its engineers 
and other technical personnel still working in Vietnam.15 Peking's 
explanation, subsequently published in Peking Review, stated 
that the reason was that Vietnam had "obdurately stepped up its 
anti-Chinese activities" and was guilty of "ostracism of Chinese 
residents in Vietnam."16 The article went on to say that Vietnam 
had "seriously damaged the friendly relations between the two 
countries," had created a "foul atmosphere of vilifying and 
inciting antagonism against China," and had destroyed the 
"minimum conditions required for the continued stay of Chinese 
experts ... to carry on aid projects."17 
In July Hanoi reported that China had cut off aid for 21 
projects in early May and had cancelled another 51 projects by the 
end of June.l8 Another source put the total number of projects 
cancelled at 72, the entire value of which was $1 billion.19 
12. East German Domestic Service, May 23, 1979, cited in Foreign Broadcast-
ing Information Service Daily Report, People's Republic of China, Vol. 1, No. 101, 
May 24, 1978, p. AS (hereafter referred to as FBIS). 
13. Vietnam News Agency, June 17, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, July 1978, p. 
15. 
14. New China News Agency, June 28, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1 No. 126, 
June 29, 1978, p. Al3. 
15. New China News Agency, July 3, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1 No. 129, July 
5, 1978, p. All. 
16. "China Compelled to Terminate Economic and Technical Aid to Vietnam," 
Peking Review, No. 28, July 14, 1978, p. 27. 
17. Ibid. 
iS. Hanoi Radio, July 5, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, August 1978, p. 16. 
19. Nayan, Chanda, "Southeast Asia comes Into Focus," Far Eastern 
&onomic Review, Vol. 101, No. 27, July 7, 1978, p. 8. 
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Japanese reporters observed over 100 Chinese technicians leave 
Hanoi on July 9, most of whom had been working on a bridge 
construction project near the capital city.20 Vietnamese officials 
told Japanese reporters at the time that the suspension of Chinese 
aid was "naturally causing certain immediate difficulties in 
Vietnam."21 The government of Vietnam also reported that in 
July China had decided to end training programs for Vietnamese 
pos~-~aduates studying in China. 22 
The scope of Chinese aid to Vietnam, if Chinese sources are to. 
be believed (and their reports were not contradicted by Hanoi), 
was much more than most Western sources had previously 
estimated: somewhere between $10 billion and $20 billion over a 
20-year period. Teng Hsiao-p'ing (Deng Xiaoping), according to 
one source, put the figure at $14 billion; a different source said he 
valued it at $18 billion.23 In this connection he was quoted as 
saying that the only thing wrong with Chinese economic aid to 
Vietnam was that "it was too much." He also asserted that the 
sum total of Chinese aid to Vietnam was "much more than from 
the Soviet Union."24 
An article in People's Daily stated that most of the "over $10 
billion" in aid to Vietnam was given in the form of grants and the 
rest in interest-free loans.25 It went on to say that China had 
provided Vietnam, over the course of thirty years, with almost $6 
billion worth of complete plants and non-military materials, 100 
locomotives, thousands of railroad cars, 700 ships, and tens of 
thousands of motor vehicles. The article also stated that many of 
these items were supplied by factories in China that were 
producing only for Vietnam, or were purchased abroad with 
"precious" foreign exchange. It also declared that China provided 
20. Vietnam News Agency, July 19, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, August 1978, 
p. 16. 
21. Kyodo News Service, July 9, 1978, cited in Ibid. 
22. "Chronical and Documentation," The China Quarterly, December 1978, p. 
65, citing a British Broadcasting Corporation summary of world broadcasts report. 
23. The former figure was mentioned in an interview with Tomokazu 
Sakamoto, chairman of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation. See China News 
(Taipei), June 6, 1978, p. 4. The second figure comes from an interview Teng had 
with visiting Thai journalists in Peking cited in Asian Recorder, p. 14427, July 
23-29, 1978. Also see Robert D. McFadden, "Chinese Gave at Least $10 Billion," 
New York Times, July 4, 1978, p. 4. 
24. Asian Recorder, July 23-29, 1978, p. 14427. 
25. See Frank Ching. "China's Cutoff of Aid to Old Allies Creates Doubt 
Among its Friends," Asian Wall Street Journal, July 27, 1978. The Author cites a 
People's Daily article of the previous week. 
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Vietnam with better weapons than it had at home and that many 
Chinese had "shed their blood and laid down their lives" in 
Vietnam. 
There were probably several important reasons behind 
China's decision to sever its aid to Vietnam, besides the fact that 
China needed more capital to finance its own modernization 
plans. First, China considered it a hostile act for Vietnam to 
mistreat and expel Chinese residents, and found it costly to 
absorb them into China, where most of them had never lived. In 
June, when Teng Hsiao-p'ing announced that Chinese aid to 
Vietnam would be reduced, he accused Hanoi of mistreating 
Chinese living in Vietnam and stated that Vietnam had "expelled 
110,000 Chinese still pretending that they had simply escaped out 
of the country." A second reason for cutting its aid was opposition 
to Hanoi's policy of creating a "Federation of Indochina." Chinese 
leaders had long advised Hanoi not to reunify Vietnam too 
quickly, and not to try to make Laos and Cambodia puppet states. 
China preferred the three Indochinese nations to remain inde-
pendent and wanted to pursue relations with them separately. 
Vietnamese leaders had not followed this advice and instead had 
stationed large numbers of troops in Laos and had infiltrated its 
government. Their policy of establishing a federation also brought 
them into direct military conflict with Kampuchea, which China 
supported and aided. Third, Chinese leaders were upset over 
Hanoi's ties with the Soviet Union and Vietnam's reliance on 
Soviet aid. Peking had expected Vietnam to solicit Western aid 
and not become overly dependent upon the Soviet Union for 
economic assistance. Chinese leaders therefore opposed Vietnam's 
industrialization plans which required increased amounts of 
Soviet aid. Chinese leaders were especially antagonized by 
Hanoi's allowing the Soviet navy to use Vietnamese ports, and 
rumors that Vietnam would give the Soviet Union exclusive and 
by unlimited use of Cam Ranh Bay in exchange for Soviet 
military assistance. China likewise opposed Soviet-Vietnamese 
cooperation in Laos and Hanoi's support of Soviet and Cuban 
activities in Mrica. 
As in the case of Vietnam, China announced work on aid 
projects in Albania both before and after the termination of aid to 
the Albanian government. In May Peking announced that a 
plastics factory had been built and put into operation in Albania, 
boasting that it was the largest of its kind in the country and was 
capable of producing 270 different kinds of plastic products and 
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items for use in industry and agriculture.26 In late July, after the 
cutoff of aid, Peking publically announced the completion of a 
factory for building prefabricated parts for houses, noting that it 
also was the largest in the nation and that it produced the parts 
for 14,000 square meters of five-storied flats. 27 
In early July, confirming rumors about strains in Sino-
Albanian relations and an end to China's foreign aid, Peking 
announced formally that it was terminating its aid to Albania 
and recalling its aid personnel there. The announcement, first 
made public through China's official news ·agency and later 
published in Peking Review for international distribution, stated 
that China had given Albania military and economic aid totaling 
more than $5 billion since 1954.28 Peking provided details in a 
note to the Albanian Embassy, also published in Peking Review, 
stating that China had signed agreements on 142 projects, 91 of 
which were said to have been finished, 23 nearly completed and 
17 surveyed or designed. According to the note, China had also 
sent 6,000 aid personnel and experts to Albania, trained 2,000 
economic and military cadres in China, delivered 1.8 million tons 
of grain, and p'rovided aid in the following areas: iron and steel, 
chemical fertilizers, caustic soda, acids, glass, copper processing, 
paper; plastics, armaments, electricity, coal, petroleum, machine 
tools, textiles, building materials, communications and broadcast-
ing.29 
The note also asserted that China had provided food aid to 
Albania when there were scarcities in China, that electric power 
stations were supplied even though electricity was in short supply 
at home, and that modern Chinese tanks and fighter planes were 
sent to Albania before China's own armed forces were equipped 
with these weapons. 30 The note further disclosed that Albania had 
been granted a $250 million interest-free loan in 1975, in addition 
to a free grant of military· aid, and in 1977 China deferred 
payments on loans for approximately $110 million repayable 
26. New China News Agency, May 29, 1978, cited in. China Aktuell, May 1978, 
p. 11. 
27. New China News Agency, July 21, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1 No. 142, July 
24, 1978, p. A17. 
28. New China News Agency, July 13, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1 No. 136, July 
14, 1978, pp. A12-A16; and "Chinese Foreign Ministry's Note on China's Forced 
Cessation of Aid to Albania," Peking Review, No. 29, July 21, 1978, pp. 2Q-23. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
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during the period 1980 to 2000.01 Mention was also made of the 
fact that all Chinese aid had taken the form of free aid or non-
interest-bearing loans. Peking obviously wanted to present an 
image of generosity. 
In explaining the reasons for stopping its aid to Albania, the 
note to the Albanian Embassy documented several cases where 
the Albanians had sabatoged aid projects or had through 
inattention or carelessness allowed accidents to occur. Also cited 
were demands by the Albanian government for more aid and for 
help to repair projects damaged or not maintained by the 
Albanian side. Finally the note reported Albania's attacks on 
China's domestic and foreign policies, anti-Chinese activities, and 
slander against the late Chairman Mao. More specifically it 
asserted that Albania had maligned China's aid program after 
having given great praise to Chinese assistance in the past, and 
had criticized China's leadership, ideology and foreign policy.32 
Albania responded by criticizing Chinese aid, specifically 
citing delays in aid deliveries of as long as six years.00 The 
Albanian government also chided Chinese efforts to control the 
Albanian economy and dictate its economic development plans. 
Albania also mentioned China's slowness in breaking with the 
Soviet Union in the 1960s, and the excesses in China during the 
Cultural Revolution. The important issue from Albania's perspec-
tive, however, seems to have been China's rapprochement with 
the United States after the death of Mao in 1976 and its 
subsequent improved relations with Yugoslavia. Albanian leaders 
may, in fact, have perceived that China was abandoning Albania 
in favor of better relations with Yugoslavia and the West. 
Certainly after improving relations with the United States, 
the Chinese viewed Albania as less valuable as an ally and for its 
strategic location; thus differences between the two countries were 
no doubt partly a product of China's changing priorities.34 
Chinese leaders were also obviously displeased with Albania's 
criticism of Mao's "Three Worlds Theory," which rationalized 
China's relations with the capitalist West and which became 
official ideology after Mao's death. It may not be coincidence that 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Zeri i Popullit (Alabania), July 30, 1978, cited in Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives, August 10, 1973, p. 2926. 
34. See "Stop the World, We Want to Get Off," Asia Week, September 1, 1978, 
p. 14 for further details on this point. 
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Peking made the announcement of the termination of its aid on 
the first anniversary of Albania's attacks on this policy. Also, 
when Albania referred to China's "imperialist tactics" in its feud 
with Vietnam, Chinese leaders were no doubt angry. In fact, this 
may have been an important factor motivating Peking to dump its 
two most important aid recipients at virtually the same time. 
The Albanian government tried to disguise the importance of 
the loss of Chinese aid by giving publicity to several economic 
accomplishments. Soon after the severance of Chinese aid, 
Albanian officials announced the installation of turbines in an 
electric power generating plant, new departments in a metallurgi-
cal complex, the production of the first Albanian-made tractor, 
and the completion of Ballash oil refinery.35 Notwithstanding, it 
was clear that the termi~ation of Chinese aid would be a blow to 
the economy, which was already experiencing serious problems. 
With China accounting for about 70 percent of Albania's trade 
and supporting a large portion of the nation's economic develop-
ment program through its aid, the loss of this economic help had 
to be felt. 
Unlike Vjetnam and Albania, Kampuchea.received increasing 
amounts of aid from China during the year. Much of China's aid 
to Kampuchea, however, was military aid and in no case was the 
exact kind or amount of aid specified. Thus it is impossible to do 
more than estimate the value of Chinese aid during the year. In 
fact, it may be more meaningful to say simply that it was 
considerable rather than try to put a dollar figure on it. On the 
other hand, Chinese assistance was not sufficient to prevent the 
successful invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces at the 
end of the year, which caused the fall of the Pol Pot regime. 
During the year, China made no official promises of new aid 
or credits to Kampuchea, though this was unnecessary in view of 
the $1 billion aid promise made in 1975, much of which had 
probably not been used. The flow of aid could be confirmed by 
project work financed by China, by the delivery of goods, and by 
the imbalance in their trade accounts. The only official mention of 
aid by China came indirectly when Pol Pot gave a party for 
Chinese technicians in Kampuchea in July.36 Kampuchean 
sources gave some details on Chinese assistance mentioning that 
35. Zeri i Popullit (Albania), October 13-15 and November 28, cited in 
Kessing's Contemporary Archives, December 10, 1978, p. 3140. 
36. New China News Agency, July 7, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 132, July 
10, 1978, p. A20. 
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Chinese technicians were working on restoring a cement factory, 
a phosphate factory, a textile mill, a plywood factory, a power 
station, a glassware factory and a tire factory.37 
The amount of aid and its importance is even better reflected 
in the diplomatic activities between the two countries, China's 
feud with Vietnam, and Kampuchea's needs. At the beginning of 
the year, China was clearly titling toward Kampuchea in its 
struggle against Vietnam.38 In January Chou En-lai's (Zhou 
Enlai) widow visited Kampuchea and met with Pol Pot. Mter her 
return to China it was reported that China regarded Kampuchea 
as a "victim of Vietnamese aggression."39 It was also reported at 
this time that Chinese soldiers were fighting in Kampuchea, 
though this could not be confirmed. 40 Hanoi at this time 
proclaimed that China was giving vast amounts of military aid to 
Kampuchea - enough to "help them build up and equip overnight 
a dozen divisions armed with long-range artillery and warplanes. 
"41 
In June and again in July, the Kampuchean Minister of 
Foreign Mfairs, Ieng Sary, visited Peking. The second visit 
coincided with a trip by Defense Minister Son Sen, who met with 
Deputy Premier Chen Hsi-lien (Chen Xilien). Chen stated at the 
time that the Chinese army would "always support the Cambo-
dian army."42 It was subsequently reported that Chinese leaders 
had agreed to supply Son Sen with large quantities of small arms 
and weapons that could be hidden in the countryside for use by 
guerrillas in the event of an invasion by Vietnam. 43 There was 
also speculation, however, that China was reluctant to continue 
37. Phnom Penh Radio, July 7, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, August 1978, p. 
15. 
38. See the two sides' statements reported by the New China News Agency on 
December 31, 1977 and January 1, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 3, 
1978, pp. A10-A11. The Vietnamese statement was truncated and summarized. 
39. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 27, 1978, p. 29295. 
40. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1979 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far 
Eastern Economic Review, Ltd., 1979), p. 325. No sources are cited. For an 
opposing view see David Binder, "Vietnam Holds Cambodian Region after Bitter 
Fight, U.S. Aides Say," New York Times, January 4, 1978. This source cites "U.S. 
officials." 
41. Hanoi Radio, February 21, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 49, February 22, 
1978, p. A10. 
42. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, October 27, 1978, p. 29295. 
43. Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia's Cry for Help," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Vol. 101, No. 32, August 11, 1978, p. 13. 
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support of the Pol Pot regime in view of its human rights record, 
China's efforts to improve relations with the United States, and 
the expectation by Chinese leaders that Vietnamese forces would 
Soon invade Kampuchea with the help of anti-Pol Pot forces in the 
country and overthrow the Pol Pot government. Chinese leaders 
may also have perceived that, owing to logistical problems, there 
was little they could do to help stop an invasion by Vietnam. 
On the other hand, Western sources reported, prior to the 
Vietnamese invasion, seeing tanks, armoured vehicles and large 
artillery in use in Kampuchea for the first time, apparently 
shipped in from China via the port of Kompong Som. 44 There were 
also reports that in July China had agreed to provide Kampuchea 
with large .. quantities of air and naval weapons and was 
expediting its training of Kampuchean pilots in China.45 In 
addition, in November Chinese instructors were seen in Battam-
bang in western Kampuchea training Khmer pilots to fly MIG-
19s.46 According to U.S. intelligence reports, Chinese were also 
helping build an airfield near Phnom Penh capable of handling 
both jet fighters and bombers.47 It was estimated at this time that 
China had 20,000 advisors and technicians in Kampuchea. 48 
Prior to and while anticipating Vietnam's invasion, Chinese 
Politburo member Wang Tung-hsing (Wang Dungxing) and 
veteran economic planner Yu Chiu-li (Yu Quili) visited Kampu-
chea while Teng Hsiao-p'ing visited Bangkok. Teng reportedly 
querried the Thai government about using Thai airspace for 
flights from China to Kampuchea, ostensibly to guarantee the 
flow of military equipment and supplies to that country in view of 
the treaty Vietnam signed with the Soviet Union on November 3 
and the expected Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea as the dry 
season approached.49 Alternatively, Teng may have had in mind 
the evacuation of Chinese personnel. It was also reported at this 
time that China twice rejected requests from the Pol Pot 
government for combat troops.50 
44. Facts on File, June 30, 1978, p. 490. 
45. Asian Recorder, September 10-16, 1978, p. 18910. 
46. Nayan Chanda, "A Dry Season Infiltration," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Vol. 102, No. 44, November 3, 1978, p. 15. 
47. CBS Evening News, seen in Memphis, Tennessee at 5:30p.m., November 9, 
1978. 
48. "Intelligence," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 46, November 
17, 1978, p. 5. 
49. Ibid. 
50. "Vietnam Lashes Out," Newsweek, December 13, 1978, p. 47. 
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In any event, the invasion of Kampuchea cut China's aid 
supply routes to Kampuchea, except what could he delivered via 
land routes through Burma and Thailand with the help of pro-
Chinese communist insurgency groups. During early 1979 it was 
still uncertain how important this might be or if there were large 
caches of Chinese weapons in the countryside. Anyway, even if 
there were stores of Chinese weapons in the country, it was 
unknown whether this would be able to help sustain a guerrilla 
campaign against the Vietnamese army in Kampuchea. 
In Laos, China's aid efforts were less definite in terms of both 
China's commitment and its successes. Peking made a number of 
offers and official promises of aid during the year, and it finished 
a major road project that had been under construction for 16 
years. Soviet economic aid to the Laotian government oversha-
dowed Chinese aid, however, and the Vietnamese presence in the 
country was larger than China's. In addition, there were clear 
signs that Laos was tilting toward Moscow and Hanoi because of 
the need for Soviet aid (foreign aid has comprised 70 percent of the 
national budget in recent years) and the presence of at least 30,000 
Vietnamese soldiers in Laos. Yet China maintained a presence in 
the north, where it had been involved in road construction for 
more than a decade. Peking appeared to be waiting for the Soviets 
and the Vietnamese to alienate the people of Laos more than they 
already had, or for the government's problems with the Meo tribes 
and other insurgents to escalate. 
In January, according to sources in Laos, China offered to 
build additional roads throughout the country and construct some 
unspecified light industries in Vientaine; but the Laotian 
government rejected the offers and instead asked China to build 
an earlier-promised brick factory in the northern part of the 
country and one new project in the capital. 51 According to Chinese 
sources its negotiators signed two protocols for aid projects with 
the government of Lafls in January, one of them for complete sets 
of equipment, the other not specified.52 
In March th~ construction of- the Laos-China Friendship 
Weaving Factory was started in Oudomsay Province in northern 
Laos. 53 And in April a turning-over ceremony was held for the Na 
51. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1969 Yearbook, p. 28. 
52. New China News Agency, January 21, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 15, 
January 23, 1978, p. A6. 
53. New China News Agency, March 14, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, April 
1978, p. 9. 
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Sang-Bou Hai Highway in upper Laos. 54 Construction on this 286-
kilometer asphalt highway, part of a Chinese-built network of 
roads in northern Laos, started in October 1973 and was 
completed in February 1978. These road projects have long 
provided China with an excuse for having worker-soldiers 
numbering up to 20,000 in Laos.55 During the American bombing 
they were protected with artillery and other weapons, which 
remained after the communist takeover in 1975. The holding of 
the ceremony may have constituted a veiled effort by the Laotian 
government, under pressure from Moscow and Hanoi, to get some 
or most of the Chinese worker-soldiers out of Laos. In any event, 
10,000 left, though they were reportedly replaced by 5,000 others to 
do some finishing work on the road network. 56 
In mid-year China's foreign aid program in Laos remained 
active, or so it seemed based on official Chinese accounts. In May 
it was reported that 20 percent of the Laos-China Friendship 
Textile Factory had been completed.57 In July Peking announced 
the beginning of work on the brick factory mentioned above. 58 In 
mid-September, however, a high Chinese official told the mayor of 
Paris that Laos is "henceforth completely dominated by Viet-
nam."59 In the context of previous and subsequent aid activity it 
appears that this remark was directed at the Laotian governJpent 
and may have been intended to pressure it to limit Soviet and 
Vietnamese efforts to extend their influence into the northern part 
of Laos. Altematively it may have been a warning to the Laotian 
government that the war in Kampuchea might spread to Laos if it 
did not maintain its neutral stance. The Laotian government's 
acceptance of Chinese Red Cross assistance at almost the same 
time the remark was made and its announcement just days after 
that an oxygen factory was being started with Chinese assistance, 
tends to support this conclusion and may indicate that Peking did 
not regard Vietnamese domination as a fact.60 Further evidence is 
54. New China News Agency, April 8, 1978, cited in ibid., May 1978, p. 11~ 
55. See Copper, China's Foreign Aid pp. 58-60 for further details. 
56. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1969 Yearbook, p. 228. 
57. Vientiane Radio, May 14, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978, p. 12. 
58. New China News Agency, July 15, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, August 
1978, p. 15. 
59. AFP, September 18, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, October 1978, p. 15. 
60. For details on the Red Cross aid see New China News Agency, September 
19, 1978, cited in FBIS Vol. 1, No. 183, September 20, 1978, p. A13, and Nayan 
Chanda, "A New Ration of Problems," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 101, 
No. 41 October 20, 1978; for details on the oxygen factory, see KPL, September 28, 
1978, cited in China Aktuell, October 1978, p. 15. 
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the organization by the Laotian government at this time of a 
photographic exhibition on Chinese development, and the sending 
of a delegation to Peking to celebrate China's national holiday.61 
In any case Chinese aid to Laos was not terminated as would 
have been expected if Chinese leaders had perceived that Laos 
had fallen into the Soviet-Vietnamese orbit. 
There were also unconfirmed reports during the year to the 
effect that China was aiding the Meo tribes with weapons and 
supplies and hoped to detach part of northern Laos from the rest 
of the country.62 Rumors emerged in this context that China was 
cutting its aid to Laos, but these were debunked by aid discussions 
and deliveries in September.63 Other reports indicated that China 
had broached the subject of building a railroad in Laos, but that 
the offer was turned down. 64 This may have been less than a 
genuine offer, however, since building a railroad, like extending 
the Chinese-built roads in Laos further south, would give the 
Soviets and Vietnamese greater access to northern Laos where 
China's influence predominates and the difficult terrain favors 
China. 
In view of the fact that Laos asked for and received economic 
aid from the United States during 1978, not to mention receiving 
aid from the United Nations and from a number of donors both 
communist and capitalist, a waning of Chinese influence is not 
necessarily indicated by the large quantities of Soviet aid 
compared to Chinese aid and the presence ofVietnamese soldiers. 
Laos seems to have tilted toward the Soviet-Vietnamese camp, but 
it has also maintained some degree of independence. China's 
continued willingness to give aid and the willingness of Laos to 
accept it, plus China's physical propinquity, seem to suggest that 
China will continue to maintain some presence and influence in 
Laos. 
III. Aid to Non-Communist Asian Countries 
China's aid to non-communist Asian countries in 1978 
followed previous patterns and there were no new recipients (with 
the exception of Thailand, which received a small Red Cross 
61. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1969 Yearbook, p. 228. 
62. Nayan Chanda, "A New Threat from the Mountain Tribes," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 35, September 1, 1978, p. 8. 
63. See MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, "Laos 1978: The Ebb and 
Flow of Adversity," Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 2, February 1978, p. 100. 
64. Nayan Chanda, "Laos Caught in the Crossfire," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Vol. 101, No. 24 June 16, 1978, p. 11. 
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donation). Afghanistan, a past recipient, was not mentioned by 
Peking in connection with its foreign aid giving in 1978, probably 
reflecting the rise of Soviet influence there. For the first time 
China probably gave more assistance in dollar terms to non-
communist Asian countries than to any other region or bloc. This 
was the product of both the cutting of aid to Vietnam and Albania 
and the increasing strategic importance of South Asia in the eyes 
of Chinese leaders. Soviet encroachments in the area and 
continuing efforts by the Kremlin to contain China, underscored 
by the pro-Soviet coup in Afghanistan, were particularily 
challenging to Chinese leaders. The goal of preventing India's 
domination of the subcontinent and an effort to maintain a 
balance of power of sorts in the region also remained important. 
The fact that China's aid went almost exclusively to countries in 
South Asia rather than Southeast Asia might be seen to reflect a 
shift in geographical focus of interest, though this is probably 
more the result of cautious attitudes on the part of leaders of the 
nations of non-communist Southeast Asian nations toward China, 
rather than a shift of strategic concern by Chinese leaders. Only 
in the case of Burma was meaningful aid .given to a communist 
party or organization, though some assistance may have been 
given to the Communist Party of Nepal. In no case can it be said 
that Chinese aid was given specifically for the purpose of 
advancing socialism or assisting the socialist sector of the 
recipients' economy. China's concern with increasing its foreign 
trade, however, did appear to be a motive in giving aid, especially 
to Nepal and Pakistan and to a lesser extent Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh. 
Aid to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal clearly increased 
during 1978. Aid to Sri Lanka and Burma remained at about the 
same level as in recent years. Pakistan was the largest non-
communist recipient of Chinese aid during the year, and 
Bangladesh the recipient of the largest aid promise during the 
year of those whose value was officially announced. Mtcr 
Kampuchea, Nepal was probably the nation most influenced by 
Chinese aid in terms of both its economic and political impact. 
Peking made several announcements of new aid in progress to 
Burma in 1978. However, no mention was made of the value of 
any of the projects promised. And, in spite of what seemed to be 
significant aid discussions and meaningful promises, Burma was 
not an important recipient of Chinese aid during the year; nor did 
China provide much of the external. assistance the Burmese 
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government obtained. The greater than usual publicity given to 
aid by China may reflect problems in its relations with the 
Burmese Communist Party which China had long supported both 
psychologically and with weapons and supplies. Alternatively, 
China's more open discussions of aid to Rangoon may simply 
have represented an attempt to prevent Burma from tilting toward 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union- a factor that had become more 
important because of the struggle for influence in Indochina. 
In March Peking announced the completion of the Meiktila 
Textile Mill in Burma, reportedly equipped with 80,000 spindles 
and 600 looms.65 That same month Chinese leaders signed an 
agreement to expand this mill with a "second-stage project."66 
One interpretation of this aid promise by China was that it was 
an effort to maintain good relations with Burma in the wake of 
the visit therjby Teng Hsiao-p'ing in late ANUARY. It may also 
have related to China's efforts to support the Pol Pot government 
in Kampuchea, since it is likely that Teng broached the subject of 
transit rights through Burma to send supplies to Kampuchea or 
for overflight privileges. Another possibility is that Teng wanted 
to pressure the Burmese communists to support China's efforts in 
Kampuchea and Laos or to actively resist Vietnamese "expansion· 
ism." China at this time was also providing supplies and probably 
weapons to the Burmese Communist Party.67 In any event, after 
Teng's visit the Burmese Communist Party mounted a new 
offensive against government forces in northern Burma and 
increased terrorists activities throughout the country. Apparently 
the Burmese Communist Party did not approve of China's aid to 
Rangoon and wanted to demonstrate its displeasure. 
In May a technical team from China arrived in Burma to 
make a feasibility study on the construction of a 10,000-seat 
indoor stadium in Rangoon.68 However, a summary of talks on 
this project was not signed until October. Meanwhile, Chinese aid 
to Burma was given a more official place when Peking Review 
publicized the textile mill it was expanding, noting that it was the 
65. New China News Agency, March 9, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, April 
1978, p. 10. 
66. Ibid. 
67. Klaus Fleishmann, "Burma," in Richard F. Staar (ed.), 1979 Yearbook on 
International Communist Affairs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 226. 
68. Rangoon Radio, May 8, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, June 1978, p. 12. Also 
see Rangoon Radio, October 20, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, November 1978, p. 10. 
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largest in the country. 69 China seemed to be making offers and 
giving publicity to its aid to Burma to test the Burmese 
government's response. 
China's foreign aid program in Nepal was active during 1978, 
and, as in previous years, continued to help prevent Nepal from 
tilting politically toward India or the Soviet Union or becoming 
economically dependent on either of these countries. China's 
foreign aid also facilitated trade and helped redirect some of 
Nepal's foreign commerce through China. A somewhat more 
active aid program than usual in 1978 (Since the 1950s China has 
regarded relations with Nepal as important to China and has 
maintained an active foreign aid program there) probably repre-
sented efforts by Chinese leaders to enlist additional support for 
their foreign policy views that were coming into direct conflict 
with Moscow and Hanoi. Alternatively aid was used to compen-
sate for not opening up Tibet to trade with Nepal as China had 
earlier promised. China sent some financial aid to a faction of the 
Communist Party of Nepal, but this probably had no effect on 
official relations between the two countries. 70 
In February Teng Hsiao-p'ing visited Katmandu, and though 
he failed to mention a major highway project that China had 
already discussed with Nepalese officials and postponed discus-
sions on a large water project, he promised three industrial 
projects and agreed that Chinese teams would soon visit Nepal to 
study other projects.71 Teng probably wanted to extract some 
promises from the Nepal government, or at least test their 
reactions to tenets of Chinese foreign policy in several realms, 
before extending additional aid. 
In March a textile mill built with Chinese aid funds went into 
operation in Nepal and 200 tons of cotton lintel were air-shipped 
from Pakistan. The mill could not operate at full capaCity, 
however, due to the lack of electricity. 72 In June an industrial 
survey team from China arrived to conduct feasibility surveys of 
ceramic, paper pulp and sugar factories. 73 And, in September 
69. "Meiktila People's Textile Mill," Peking Review, No. 31, August 4, 1978, p. 
30. 
70. Barbara Reid, "Nepal," in Richard F. Staar (ed.), 1979 Yearbook on 
International Communist Affairs, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 
274. 
71. The Asian Student, February 25, 1978, p. 4. 
72. Asian Recorder, March 12-18, 1978, p. 12411. 
73. Katmandu Radio, June 14, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, June 1978, p. 15. 
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Peking signed an agreement with the government of Nepal on the 
construction of "complete projects." 74 The Chinese side failed to 
mention the costs or conditions involved in the agreement; 
however, it was reported by other sources as valued at $40 million 
and designated for the building of a sugar refinery and a paper 
mill. 75 In December the Chinese media reported the completion of 
the Hetanda Cotton Textile Printing and Dyeing Mill, which at 
that time was handed over to the Nepal government. It was said 
to be the largest of its kind in the country and capable of turning 
out 10 million meters of cloth per year. 76 
China's aid to Nepal during the year may be viewed as 
successful in maintaining friendly ties between the two countries 
and even in improving relations. Nepal supported the China-
Japan treaty, although this should perhaps be attributed as much 
to the generous aid given and promised by Japan. Nepal's 
continued close relations with India probably did not bother 
Chinese leaders too much, while cooling relations with the Soviet 
Union, in spite of an agreement signed during the year by Moscow 
to build a turpentine factory in Nepal, no doubt pleased Peking. 
China's aid to Pakistan was extensive and though it exceeded 
aid given to any other non-communist Asian country, it did not 
make up a large portion of Pakistan's total economic help. Nor did 
it facilitate economic development in any significant way. On the 
other hand, China's assistance was useful and helped maintain 
friendly ties between the two countries, and it helped parry Soviet 
overtures and threats. Roadbuilding was very important and two 
other forms of aid offered great possibilities: a steel mill and 
nuclear reprocessing facilities. Like China's aid activities in 
Burma and Nepal, new difficulties with the Soviet Union and 
Vietnam, combined with the savings resulting from cutting aid to 
Vietnam and Albania, influenced decisions resulting in more aid 
to Pakistan. 
In January Islamabad announced.that China had agreed to 
supply Pakistan with a timber seasoning plant, but furnished no 
further details on this aid donation. 77 At almost the same time the 
74. New China News Agency, October 1, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 193, 
October 2, 1978, p. A10. 
75. Lok Raj Baral, "Nepal 1979: Year of Hopes and Confusions," Asian 
Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 2, February 1979, p. 201. 
76. New China News Agency, December 30, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, 
January 1979, p. 12. 
77. Karachi Radio, January 15, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, January 1978, p. 
9. 
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Pakistan government announced that China was providing 
engineering training to Pakistanis. 78 In March government 
officials in Islamabad revealed that iron ore deposits had been 
discovered in Baluchistan through exploration work aided by 
China and that a feasibility study was being conducted by China 
for a "mini" steel mill there. 79 It was also made known at this time 
that China was providing aid, technical training, and machinery 
for a glass factory.~ 
China's most important aid project in Pakistan, the 500-mile 
Karakoram Highway, was completed in May and inaugurated in 
June. This highway was started 15 years ago by Chinese and 
Pakistani army engineer corps. The Chinese segment was 
completed in 1970, after which Peking made available its 
engineers and equipment to Pakistan. The first phase of 
construction on the highway in Pakistan was finished in 1971; the 
second was started in 1974 and completed in May 1978.81 Work on 
the road had been kept as secret as possible, but became widely 
known during 1977 when local tribes tried to block construction 
through sabatoge and the taking hostage of Chinese and 
Pakistani workers and engineers. An undisclosed number were 
killed and the Pakistani government had to dispatch troops to the 
area so that work could continue. 82 President Ziar revealed at the 
time of the road's completion that more than 400 Chinese and 
Pakistanis had lost their lives building the road (though many 
died from causes unrelated to the violent activities of the local 
tribes) and that at times 20,000 Chinese workers had been helping 
on the project. 83 According to Chinese reports, stone and earth 
work totaled 16.9 million cubic meters, and 85 bridges were built 
with a combined length of 3,631 meters.84 Part of the reason for 
the extensive earth moving was the occurrence of an earthquake 
in the region in 1974 and a number of avalanches. 
The road is an all-weather one and connects Pakistan's 
capital with roads and railroads in China. More than this, it 
provides the final link in a continuous road system from China's 
78. Karachi Radio, January 17, 1978, cited in Ibid. 
79. Karachi Radio, March 7, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, March 1978, p. 9. 
80. Karachi Radio, March 3, 1978, cited in Ibid. 
81. See "Karakoram Highway," Peking Review, No. 27, July 7, 1978, p. 42. 
82. See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1977," Current Scene, Vol. XVI, Nos. 
8 and 9, p. 27, for further details. 
83. Asian Recorder, July 30-August 5, 1978, p. 14990. 
84. "Karakoram Highway," Peking Review, No. 27, July 7, 1978, p. 42. 
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Pacific coast to the Atlantic shore of Europe. The road will also 
open isolated parts of Pakistan, some of which are known to be 
abundant in minerals and precious stones, including diamonds, 
gold and mica. And it will facilitate the development of 
hydroelectric resources in northern Pakistan. Finally, it is 
strategically important to Pakistan, particularly in view of the 
coup in Mghanistan during the year. 
In July the Pakistan government announced that a-fertilizer 
plant was being built at Haripur with Chinese assistance at a cost 
of $37 million.85 However, no details were provided on the amount 
of financial aid provided by China for the project or the 
conditions. In August it was confirmed that China would help in 
building a small steel mill in Baluchistan.86 In November a sugar 
mill built with Chinese aid and capable of producing 400,000 tons 
of sugar a year, went into operation. 87 Again, however, no details 
on the costs of these projects or the conditions of aid were 
mentioned. 
In the fall it was reported that China had offered Pakistan the 
technology to process spent nuclear fuel and extract pure 
plutonium.88 According t~ this source the promise was made after 
France's cancellation of an agreement to supply Pakistan with a 
reprocessing plant. The report was made more credible by the fact 
that President Ziar had assured the public that he would get the 
reprocessing facilities one way or the other. However, the absence 
of followup reports or any mention of the offer by the Chinese 
government suggests that no such offer was made or that it was 
only a tentative proposal. 
No mention was made during the year of Chinese military 
assistance to Pakistan, but given the importance and amounts of 
Chinese military aid in the past, it is likely that some may have 
been delivered. A Soviet source reported that Pakistan was 
sending Chinese military equipment to Somalia, but this was 
officially denied by the Pakistan Foreign Ministry.89 
China's aid to Pakistan during 1978 had considerable 
influence, in combination, of course, with other instruments of its 
85. Karachi Radio, July 12, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, August 1978, p. 15. 
86. Karachi Radio, August 5, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, September 1978, p. 
13. 
87. Karachi Radio, November 6, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, December 1978, 
p. 13. 
88. See footnote 6. 
89. New China News Agency, February 6, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 31, No.1, 
February 7, 1978, p. A9. 
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foreign policy. Pakistan made a move to leave the Central Treaty 
Organization during the year, but was pursuaded by China not to. 
The coup in Afghanistan and that country's tilting toward 
Moscow had an impact in Pakistan, but this was no doubt 
lessened because of ties with China and Peking's economic aid 
to Pakistan. Pakistan resisted direct Soviet overtures and 
Indian pressures probably in large part because of its ties with 
China which were augmented by aid. Chinese aid also had special 
importance in the context of the cessation of U.S. aid to Pakistan 
because of the patterns efforts to gain nuclear status. 
China was active in supplying aid to Sri Lanka during 1978, 
but this took the form mostly of completing projects started in 
previous years. Another rice-for-rubber deal was concluded on the 
25th anniversary of the first such agreement, and as usual its 
terms were favorable to Sri Lanka. No figures were given on any 
new aid or projects in progress, probably because they were not 
impressive compared to Western aid projects and Sri Lanka 
wanted to praise China's generosity thinking this would attract 
more Western aid. In addition, Peking probably did not want the 
monetary value of its aid compared to that given by Western 
nations. 
In May Peking reported the completion of a cotton spinning 
mill started in Sri Lanka in 1976.90 This mill reportedly can 
produce 1.6 million kilograms of yarn a year, and is the largest of 
its kind in the country. In August a fish-breeding experimental 
station built with Chinese aid and technical help was turned over 
to the Sri Lanka government.91 The station breeds the Chinese 
grass carp which is now raised in rivers, lakes and reservoirs in 
Sri Lanka. 
China's aid to Sri Lanka continued to help balance India's 
influence, and it was apparently deemed useful for China to 
maintain ties with one of the important leaders of the non-aligned 
nations. The fact of a rightist government in Sri Lanka seemed to 
make little difference to Chinese leaders, who had been reluctant 
to aid the former socialist regime because of its unproductive 
economic policies and inefficient use of aid. Granting new aid, 
however, may have been pointedly avoided in order not to evoke 
90. New China News Agency, May 19, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978, 
p. 12. 
· 91. New China News Agency, August 14, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 158, 
August 15, 1978, p. A20. 
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the suggestion that China favored the new regime over the 
previous socialist one. 
China's aid program to Bangladesh followed the pattern of 
the two previous years. Some of the aid promised in 1977 was 
formalized by being publically announced, naming specific 
projects and the value of Chinese commitment to each. Appar-
ently Chinese leaders perceived that aid to Bangladesh would be 
seen by both the world and the Chinese people as needed and 
generous. Peking successfully cultivated good relations with the 
Bangladesh government, especially when compared to relations 
between that government and the Soviet Union. This probably 
explains why China granted aid, why it refrained from assisting 
any communist movement in the country, and why it was willing 
to announce the value of its aid even though a number ofWestern 
countries were more active and more generous in giving aid to 
Bangladesh. Nothing was heard about the continuing of military 
aid, however, which was expected after a promise in 1977 to 
provide Bangladesh with MIG-21 aircraft and other weapons. 
In March China signed an agreement with the government of 
Bangladesh to provide an interest-free loan for $60 million to build 
a fertilizer plant.92 According to a Bangladesh source, this plant 
will produce 180 tons of urea per day when finished. 93 Also 
included in the agreement was a water conservancy project that 
will provide irrigation facilities for 4,500 acres of land. In April 
China announced that it would train officials and technicians for 
work in fish hatcheries in Bangladesh, making use of an 
experimental fishery grounds developed in Canton by the U.N. 
Development Program and the Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion. 94 This is one of the few times China has cooperated with the 
United Nations in the aid realm and set a precedent for 
conducting such a cooperative project in China. 
China's aid efforts both paralleled and augmented a success-
ful effort to increase trade with Bangladesh. Two top-ranking 
Chinese leaders visited Dacca during the year, apparently to 
discuss trade ties. China ostensibly wanted to increase its 
commercial ties with Bangladesh to offset India's influence in the 
area and compensate for the decline of Bangladesh-Soviet trade. 
92. "Intelligence," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 13, March 31, 
1978, p. 5. 
93. Dacca Radio, March 21, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, March 1978, p. 9. 
94. New China News Agency, April 3, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, April1978, 
p. 11. 
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Peking may have had still another motive in mind: Bangladesh 
can serve to help China improve its relations with Middle Eastern 
countries where China also seeks to counter Moscow's growing 
influence. 
During the year China also donated $30,000 in cash through 
the Chinese Red Cross to help flood victims in Thailand. 95 This 
was the first time China had extended aid in any form to 
Thailand and represents much-improved relations between the 
two countries in recent years. This donation might also be seen as 
specifically related to China's concern with events in Kampuchea, 
particularly the need to fly through Thai airspace or emPloy 
communist groups in Thailand to help support the wareffort in 
Kampuchea. 
IV. Aid to African Countries 
China officially granted aid or continued aid projects in 
progress to thirty-one African countries, two more than in 1977. 
Five to ten nations can be categorized as important recipients of 
Chinese aid. Tanzania has been and remains China's most 
important aid recipient in Africa, though Chinese economic 
support to that country continued to show a decline and in 1978 
there were clear indications that this trend would not be reversed. 
Zamia, Somalia and Zaire would also classify as major recipients. 
Peking's recent aid agreements with Chad, Cameroon and 
Botswana may make these countries significant recipients in the 
future, though relative only to aid projects in those countries, not 
as a part of China's total foreign aid program because of the small 
size of these countries. Four African nations, Botswana, Sychelles, 
Surinam and Liberia, received aid from China for the first time in 
1978. Ghana, a nation that had been an important recipient of 
Chinese aid in the past, but with whom the aid connection had 
been severed, received aid again in 1978. 
Most of China's aid to African countries took the form of 
small project aid. Moreover, China's aid program in Africa during 
1978 suggested that this emphasis may be lasting: Peking had 
cause for disappointment in large aid projects because of problems 
with the Tan-Zam Railroad during the year. On the other hand, 
Peking continued work on several major road projects and 
committed itself to more road building in 1978. Medical aid and 
95. New China News Agency, October 14, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 20, 
October 16, 1978, p. AlO. 
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agricultural projects constituted an important part of China's aid 
giving in Africa during the year, continuing a trend of the past 
decade. China provided very little military aid to nations of the 
region during the year, Zaire being the only country that received 
weapons officially. Peking sent arms to guerrillas operating in 
and against Rhodesia, but its aid to rebel groups, like its support 
for "wars of national liberation" in general, continued to decline. 
Little support was provided to local communist parties or groups. 
China's motives for aid giving in Africa seemed intimately 
related to its foreign policy objectives in the area, the most 
important of which was to counter-act Soviet influence. Chinese 
decision makers seemed more motivated than usual by efforts to 
build support for China's positions in the United Nations and its 
leadership of Third World nations, probably again reflecting 
Peking's conflict with the Soviet Union. Political motives clearly 
took precedence over facilitating economic development or 
building trade ties, even though both of the latter were as 
apparent or more apparent than in Chinese aid giving elsewhere. 
China continued to maintain a good reputation for purveying 
projects that could be finished quickly and would show an 
immediate result. As in previous years China continued to find its 
policy of making its aid personnel live at local standards of living, 
its low-cost labor, and grass roots projects good publicity for its 
foreign aid program. 
China demonstrated during 1978 an even greater willingness 
than in past years to aid countries that also received economic 
assistance, even in large amounts, from Western nations, and 
where Chinese aid had little hope of much impact. In fact, judging 
from China's aid efforts in Africa in 1978, China now has little 
concern with "Western imperialism." Nor was there any shunting 
of U.N. aid work. Peking seemed to be joining the international 
community to a greater degree, or at least sought to use the 
international community and tum it against the Soviet Union. 
One of China's specific motives in this context was to-influence 
the non-aligned nations of Africa to keep the Kremlin from 
gaining leadership of this movement and thereby winning control 
over the Third World generally. This no doubt prompted Chinese 
efforts in Africa to assume an anti-Cuban bent in view of 
Havana's support for Moscow's leadership of the non-aligned 
nations and a pending meeting of that group in Cuba. 
Tanzania and Zambia, two of the most important recipients of 
Chinese aid in previous years, continued to receive significant 
Chinese assistance during 1978. Of greatest importance was the 
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return of Chinese railroad workers and advisors to keep the Tan-
Zam Railroad working.96 Until recently this line was land-locked 
Zambia's major transport link for the export of its copper. In 1978, 
however, various problems arose and the question of the line's 
profitability, and, therefore, its usefulness, became more serious. 
In mid-year it was reported in Zambia that 19 or 27 locomotives 
were under repair and that half of the train cars were not in 
operation. Moreover, for various other reasons, including three 
major accidents, the tum-around trip from Zambia to the port of 
Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, originally projected to take 15 days, 
was requiring five weeks.97 It was also reported that Tanzanian 
and Zambian workers assigned to the line were disgruntled and 
that thefts of thousands of dollars worth of goods had occurred. 98 
The result of all these problems was the tie-up of 30,000 tons of 
copper in Zambia, causing serious economic problems for a 
country dependent on exports of this mineral for ninety percent of 
its foreign exchange. 
The crisis forced Zambia's President Kaunda to announce the 
opening of the long-closed railroad line from Zambia through 
Rhodesia. Also contributing to his decision were the lack of 
fertilizer for the nation's maize crop, the International Monetary· 
Fund's demand that Zambia solve its transport problem and 
internal political opposition which supported using the rail line 
through Rhodesia. 99 
In response,' and no doubt fearing the credibility of its largest 
aid project and thus its foreign aid program in general, China 
agreed to extend the stay of 750 railroad experts who were to leave 
Tanzania and Zambia in 1978 and leave 60 instructors as well. 100 
Later Chinese drivers and guards were also sent back to run the 
trains after the arrest of twenty Zambian crew members for 
stealing.l01 By the end of 1978, however, it was uncertain what 
96. For further details see Copper, China's Foreign Aid, supra note 8, pp. 
103-08. 
97. John Borrell, "Chinese Back on Zambia Railways," The Guardian 
(London), July 6, 1978, p. 8. 
98. Ibid.; Alan Cowell, "Trouble on the Mainline: Political Events Disrupt 
Zambia's Rail Link," Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1978, p. 14. 
99. Radio Accra, October 4, 1978, cited in Africa Research Bulletin, September 
15-0ctober 14, 1978, p. 4795. 
100. Daily News, (Tanzania), August 1, 1978, cited in Africa Research Bulletin, 
July 15-August 14, 1978, p. 4773. 
101. John Borrell, "Chinese Back on Zambia Railways," The Guardian 
(London), July 6, 1978, p. 3. 
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effect this was going to have on the efficiency of the line or the 
decision by the Zambian government to seek alternative transpor-
tation routes. 
Other aid announced to Tanzania during the year included 
medical teams and doctors and a promise to help the coal mining 
industry. In January a medical team completed work in Z&nzibar, 
and in September a group of 44 Chinese doctors left the country 
and were replaced by a new group. 102 In the fall a protocal was 
signed by the two countries on economic and technical coopera-
tion, but aid was not mentioned specifically.103 In October it was 
reported that China had turned down requests by the Tanzanian 
government for another rail line and an iron ore extraction 
project, but instead promised a coal mining project. 104 While 
China's foreign aid program continued to be active in Tanzania, 
with projects promised in recent years being implemented 
(including iron ore mining, steel production and the China-
Tanzania Joint Shipping Company), 1978 witnessed no new aid 
promises or undertakings of any significance. 105 Thus, China did 
not keep pace with other donors that were providing Tanzania 
with economic assistance, and a nation that was once very 
dependent upon Chinese foreign aid is no longer. 
Peking did not seem alarmed at this prospect and may, in 
fact, be satisfied with Tanzania's growing reliance upon Western 
aid. China has kept Soviet influence out of this part of Mrica and 
this may be all that Chinese leaders want. In this connection it is 
interesting to note that Chinese aid to Tanzania, especially to its 
steel industry, indicates a diminishing concern by China with 
fostering socialism and instead with greater attention to economic 
feasibility. Tanzania's steel industry uses incentive methods to 
enhance worker productivity, apparently with Peking's blessing 
and even encouragement.106 This suggests, together with other 
evidence, that China is receptive to further cooperation with 
Western aid donors and may indicate that Chinese leaders 
102. New China News Agency, September 23, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, 
September 1978, p. 15. 
103. New China News Agency, September 14, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 
180, September 15, 1978, p. A15. 
104. "Intelligence," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 41, October 13, 
1978, p. 5. 
105. For further details see African Research Bulletin, April15-May 14, 1978, p. 
4520. 
106. Ibid. 
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perceive that capitalist development may be a way to guard 
against Soviet influence, China's overriding concern at the pres-
ent time. 
In Zambia specific projects receiving attention during the 
year were the construction of a "palace of the people" and medical 
aid. The former project was given coverage in the press in China 
in February and the latter was mentioned at the end of the year. 107 
Aid to Zambia, like China's economic assistance to Tanzania, 
seems to be designed to insure that the Soviet Union will not gain 
a foothold in the area. Western aid to Zambia has also increased 
and again China seemed unconcerned. More specifically, Chinese 
aid to Zambia during 1978 seemed aimed at preserving some 
influence with the Zambia government particularly at precluding 
decisions that would have a bad effect on the Tan-Zam Railroad. 
On the other hand, the rail line is not as important to Peking now 
that China has found large reserves of copper at home, while 
better relations between Zambia and Rhodesia may be seen by 
China to limit Soviet opportunities in the area. In short, Chinese 
leaders now have reason to question the basic assumptions which 
motivated undertaking and finishing China's largest aid project. 
China's foreign aid to Somalia was extensive in 1978. 
However, despite offers of military aid in 1977, Somalia's needs, 
and speculation about Chinese arms aid to Somalia in 1978, there 
was no confirmation of any deliveries of Chinese weapons. Peking 
in effect denied giving military aid to Somalia by publishing the 
Pakistan government's refutation of a Soviet report that Chinese 
weapons had been shipped to Somalia by Pakistan.108 If indeed no 
arms were sent, the probable reason for China's restraint was that 
Somalia preferred to get weapons from Middle Eastern countries 
and the United States, and was successful in so doing. Peking 
may also have anticipated that its arms deliveries would be more 
than offset by Soviet military aid to Ethiopia and that it was to its 
advantage in terms of reducing Soviet influence in the area to let 
the Arabs and the Americans get involved. 
In April China reported sending medical personnel to replace 
those working in Somalia. 109 During the same month it was 
107. New China News Agency, February 23, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 41, 
February 24, 1978, p. A9; China News Agency, December 23, 1978, cited in FBIS, 
Vol. 1, No. 269, December 24, 1978, p. A12. 
108. New China News Agency, February 6, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 26, 
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109. New China News Agency, April 30, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978, 
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publicized that a bridge started in December 1977 was finished. 110 
China also agreed to take over several irrigation projects started, 
but not finished, by the Soviet Union. 111 Finally, in September 
local sources reported on Chinese assistance to rice growing. 11 2 
The biggest Chinese aid project in Somalia, however, was a 
970-kilometer all-weather road finished in July after three years of 
work. In August Vice-Premier Chen Mu-hua (Chen Muhua), an 
alternate member of the politburo and the person in charge of 
China's foreign aid program, attended the opening ceremony. The 
road now serves as a link between northern and southern 
Somalia, making possible the shipping of agricultural products 
from the south to the pastoral areas of the north.m Since the road 
is close to the border with Ethiopia throughout most of the area it 
transverses, and since it connects with a road that leads to the 
capital city of Mogadishu, it obviously has military uses, and the 
speed of construction seems to reflect that fact. According to 
Peking, the project was originally turned down by Western 
countries because of the cost of transporting water to construction 
sites, a problem which the Chinese easily solved by building wells, 
water storage areas and canals - which were given to the 
Somalia government when the project was finished. 114 Another 
benefit for Somalia was the reported training by the Chinese of 
2,500 native workers in various skills during the course of the 
project. 1 L"> Though Peking did not cite the value of the project, 
Western sources put the final cost of the project at $64 million, 
noting that it was financed by a soft-term loan. 116 
Zaire was the most important recipient of Chinese military 
assistance in Africa during 1978 and probably second only to 
Kampuchea elsewhere. This assistance took the form of a 
continuation of military aid given previously to repel the invasion 
of Angolan forces, plus new supplies of arms. Peking wanted to 
110. New China Naws Agency, April 23, 1978, cited in ibid. 
111. New China News Agency, April 21, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 79, 
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offset Soviet influence in the region and Zaire was seen to still 
occupy a · central, strategic location. In June, when Chinese 
Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited Zaire, it was reported that 
China was helping train Zaire's naval forces and that a military 
delegation from Zaire would visit China soon to discuss additional 
military assistance.117 During that visit Huang promised Presi-
dent Mobutu "full support" for Zaire's just struggle to safeguard 
its national independence against "a new aggression by ... 
Soviet socialist imperialism."118 Subsequently it was reported that 
Zaire had requested that China provide two patrol boats and 20 
tanks.ll 9 According to a Western source, China in mid-year was in 
the process of making deliveries, but was not sending any troops 
or advisors as had been previously rumored. 120 
China also provided other assistance to Zaire during the year. 
In January Chinese sources mentioned aid for the construction of 
rice fields. 121 Subsequently Zaire's president visited a construction 
site where Chinese aid was in use. 122 Several other aid projects 
started in previous 'years were continued, and Zaire remained one 
of China's most important aid recipients in Africa. 
China made a number of other publically-announced aid 
promises to Mrican countries during 1978. The most important 
one was an agreement to build a bridge over the Chari River 
between Cameroon and Chad and a $16.6 million interest-free 
loan repayable over 20 years to Botswana for unspecified 
development projects.123 The former agreement with Cameroon 
and Chad also mentioned the possibility of building a new road on 
both sides of the border leading to the bridge. If this deal is 
finalized the project will become considerably larger and more 
expensive. Late in the year China promised Madagascar a 223-
kilometer road project, apparently an extension or addition to a 
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road started there by China in 1976.124 China also promised to 
build a dam in Burundi. 125 
Less important aid promises made by Peking to African 
countries during the year include a state farm to Botswana,126 
medical aid to Chad, 127 a rice mill in Kenya, 128 and a sugar 
industry in Sierra Leone that would reportedly employ 2,000 
people. 1 ~~ Protocol agreements were signed on rice and vegetable 
farms and a sugar project for Liberia, 130 and on medical aid, a 
sugar project and a station for disseminating information on rice 
growing for Togo. 131 Minutes were signed on agreements for a well 
drilling project in Senegall32 and four health centers in GambiaY~3 
Unspecified aid was promised to Rwanda, after which the 
Rwanda government mentioned a rice-growing project, a cement 
works, a hospital, a sports stadium and a flour mill.134 In two 
cases Peking attached a monetary value to new, small aid projects 
in Africa: $3 million for building secondary schools in Sey-
chelles135 and the renegotiation of a $56 million loan made to 
Mozambique in 1975 (the amount which had not been used, 
however, was not specified).136 
Actual aid deliveries recorded during the year to less 
important African recipients include the following: Medicl:}l teams 
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arrived in Chad late in the year;137 agriculture technicians were 
reported dispatched from China to Mozambique;138 Surinam 
received rice hulling machines as a gift during the year;139 an 
agriculture team was sent to the Congo;140 and a medical team 
was sent to the Central African Empire. 141 
Aid in progress was reported in a number of African countries 
not already cited. These were as follows: construction under way 
on a state-owned palace in Cameroon;142 a sugar mill and a 
plantation being built in Liberia; 143 work in progress on a 7,000-
seat gymnasium in Ethiopia;144 a hydroelectric station under 
construction in Equatorial Guinea;145 work in progress on an 
irrigation works in Niger;146 an ice plant being built in Uganda;147 
a rice research station under construction in Mauritania;148 well 
drilling underway in Nigeria;149 Chinese technicians helping to 
improve bamboo workshops in Madagascar.150 In addition, 
Chinese medical teams were reported on duty in Cameroon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, and Malagasy.151 
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Chinese aid projects reported completed during the year in 
Africa in addition to those already mentioned were a power 
station with seven kilometers of distribution line turned over to 
the Ethiopian government; 152 a bridge finished in Sierra Leone 
that will contribute to that nations part of the Trans-West Mrican 
Highway,153 plus a stadium; 154 a hydroelectric station put into 
operation in the Congo;155 a spinning mill finished and equipped 
with Chinese-made machines in Ghana;156 two rice growing 
stations completed in Togo; 157 and a reclamation area for rice 
growing finished in Upper Volta.15M 
Besides the aid promises and work in progress cited above, 
China gave some emergency and Red Cross aid to Mrican 
nations. Early in the year China provided Senegal with 1,000 tons 
of powdered milk to help drought victims there. 159 In April the 
Chinese Red Cross donated $60,000 to help drought victims in 
MauritaniaY30 And in September the Chinese Red Cross gave a 
monetary donation of an unspecified amount to the government of 
Burundi to help people in cholera-affected areas. 16 1 
Some of these promises, donations, deliveries and completions 
of projects deserve special comment. It is significant that China 
continued to purvey aid to Ethiopia in view of that country's war 
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with Somalia and China's adamant support for the latter. Chinese 
decision makers apparently perceived that a continued presence in 
Ethiopia may have some value or that the situation there was so 
fluid that Soviet influence in that country may not be permanent. 
It is also interesting that Peking was willing to deliver aid and 
have active Chinese aid personnel in Uganda in view of that 
country's conflict with Tanzania. Again Chinese policy makers 
may have felt that their presence in Uganda was worth 
continuing the aid relationship with that country. 
V. Aid to Other Countries 
Nine Middle Eastern countries received Chinese aid in 1978, 
two more than in 1977. Lebanon was the only new recipient, with 
aid to that country taking the form of emergency Red Cross help. 
Only two Latin American countries and one non-communist 
European country received Chinese economic assistance. This 
small list of recipients outside the communist bloc, Asia and 
Africa was consistent with previous years. The sole new recipient 
in Latin America was Jamaica. Egypt and Chile were nations 
noticeably absent from China's list of aid recipients in 1978. In 
the case of Egypt, China probably did not extend any aid because 
it was not requested. Chinese military aid had been provided to 
Egypt in 1977 after the Soviets pulled out and when Egypt needed 
spare parts for MIG aircraft and other Soviet-made weapons. 
During 1978 Egypt had less need for military aid and was getting 
help from the oil rich Arab nations and the United States. Hence, 
the absence of any mention of aid in 1978 does not indicate a 
change in relations between China and Egypt. However, the fact 
that China did not provide any foreign aid to Chile may be taken 
to reflect a new attitude on the part of Chinese leaders toward that 
nation. 
Chinese leaders seem to have changed their global perspective 
very little, at least as reflected in their aid giving in Latin 
America, the Middle East and non-communist Europe. China's 
interest in the Middle East remained considerable and its support 
went to the Arabs and to countries that were anti-Soviet or where 
Peking perceived that it could help stave off Soviet penetration. 
Peking saw Soviet goals in the Middle East as part of continuing 
Soviet efforts to surround and contain China with its naval power. 
This was seen as particularly true of efforts by the Kremlin to 
obtain ports for the Soviet navy. Chinese leaders perceived that if 
the Soviet Union could link its European and Asian fleets, China 
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would be threatened. Thus, Peking did not seem to be troubled by 
the fact that most of the countries in the Middle East that it aided 
were also receiving assistance from the oil-rich countries of the 
region. Moreover, China seemed to perceive U.S. efforts there as 
complementary to its own. In more specific terms China's aid 
efforts to Sudan and North and South Yemen appeared directly 
related to the Soviet presence in Ethiopia and to Moscow's efforts 
at gaining a foothold in South Yemen. Elsewhere China's aid 
efforts were largely symbolic. 
In May a Chinese technical team arrived in the capital of the 
Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) to help build a cotton-
ginning and oil-processing plant. 16 :1 Shortly thereafter, Chinese 
sources reported that a new medical team was being sent to 
replace one that was leaving.16~ Later in the year foreign sources 
reported that China had agreed to render assistance to North 
Yemen during its next five-year plan.164 Projects mentioned 
included a textile mill, an oil-processing plant, a hospital, an 
agricultural project and a 90-kilometer highway. However, no 
information was forthcoming on the cost of these projects or the 
conditions of Chinese aid. In December a protocol agreement was 
signed on the construction of an international conference hall. 1 " 5 
According to this agreement, China would undertake the design 
and construction and pay for the equipment and materials. 
Peking's purpose in providing continued and extensive 
support to North Yemen seemed to relate to its efforts to maintain 
some influence in an area that Chinese leaders saw as geopoliti-
cally important. In addition, it related to Chinese hopes of 
winning support in the Middle East for its global policies and for 
weakening Soviet influence in the area as a whole. The situation 
in North Yemen was certainly of considerable concern to other 
Arab countries. Finally, aid personnel gave China a presence in 
North Yemen that it would not otherwise have had. Ironically, 
Chinese leaders seemed to have little interest in fostering socialist 
economic development or building a communist movement in 
North Yemen. 
China also continued to render aid to the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), even though that nation was 
162. New China News Agency, May 10, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, June 1978, 
p. 12. 
163. New China News Agency, May 15, 1978, cited in Ibid. 
164. Reuter, August 16, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, September 1978, p. 13. 
165. New -China News Agency, December 20, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, 
January 1979, p. 12. 
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at odds with North Yemen and China favored the latter. In 
January Chinese sources reported that a state-owned fishery 
company, promised in an aid agreement with South Yemen in 
1977, was under construction.166 In April an agreement was 
signed between the two countries whereby China agreed to send 
medical teams. 167 At almost the same time a group of Chinese 
road construction technicians arrived to assist in the construction 
of the Shihr-Sayhut Highway.168 No details, however, were 
provided on either the cost of this project or the conditions under 
which Chinese aid was given. In June it was announced that 
another highway was under construction that would form part of 
the Aden-Mukalla Highway network. 169 This new highway link 
was designed to connect the capital city of Aden with the cereal 
and cotton-producing areas of the country. 
Notwithstanding this rather intense aid activity there was no 
mention by the Chinese media of any aid to South Yemen during 
the last half of the year. Given the situation in South Yemen, 
especially the growing Soviet influence there, Peking may have 
perceived that its aid efforts were futile and thus wasted. This is 
confirmed by an announcement in December that a Chinese 
technical team which had built a tool and hardware factory in 
1976, but had remained in the country to train Yemeni workers, 
was departing .170 
. - . ---·- --- - - . ---
China's aid efforts in South Yemen were aimed at maintain-
ing some presence that country, where Soviet influence had 
grown, and to prevent South Yemen from falling completely into 
the Soviet orbit. A further goal was to retain some influence in the 
event that either a reconciliation with North Yemen or a military 
victory brought about the union of the two countries. Neither of 
these aims, however, seemed to hold good prospects for realiza-
tion. In fact, the waning of Chinese aid activity in the latter part 
of the year may have reflected the view by Chi."lese decision-
166. New China News Agency, January 5, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, 
February 1978, p. 9. For further details on the 1977 agreement, see Copper, 
"China's Foreign Aid in 1977," Current Scene, Vol. XVI, Nos. 8 and 9, p. 29. 
167. New China News Agency, April16, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978, 
p. 11. 
168. New China News Agency, April 19, 1978, cited in ibid. 
169. New China News Agency, June 22, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, July 1978, 
p. 15. 
170. New China News Agency, December 24, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, 
January 1979, p. 12. 
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makers that South Yemen had already come under Soviet 
domination, or China's presence was not welcome, or both. 
Sudan was the third country in the Middle East where 
China's foreign aid program was active. In February the 
Hassaheisa Friendship Textile Mill, built with Chinese aid, was 
completed and turned over to the Sudan government. 171 According 
to Chinese press comments the mill employs 1,700 workers and 
produces 14 million meters of cloth annually. 172 In June a Chinese 
survey team started work on another textile mill, apparently 
under provisions made in a new agreement, though no negotia-
tions were announced by either side. 173 In November an agree-
ment was signed on the building with Chinese aid funds of a 
factory to produce ready-made clothing.174 Under the terms of this 
agreement, which was apparently provisionally agreed on in 
June, China pledged to provide equipment, spare parts and 
training for employees of this factory, which was designed to 
produce 200,000 garments yearly. It was also reported that 
Chinese workers and technicians had been doing maintenance 
work on a hall which they had built earlier. 175 Lastly, the Chinese 
Red Cross in August donated just over $100,000 to help flood 
victims in Sudan.176 
Elsewhere in the Middle East, Chinese sources reported that 
its medical teams were working in several hospitals in Tunisia.177 
In addition, late in the year it was disclosed that equipment from 
China had arrived in Tunisia for the construction of a 120-
kilometer canal that will provide drinking water and irrigation 
water for a large citrus-fruit orchard.178 The cost of the project, 
which was negotiated in 1977, and has a I_>rojected date of 
171. New China News Agency, February 28, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, 
March 1978, p. 9. 
i 72. New China News Agency, May 28, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, June 1978, 
p. 12. 
173. New China News Agency, June 7, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, July 1978, 
p. 15. 
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December 1978, p. 13. 
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August 23, 1978, p. A14. 
176. New China News Agency, August 8, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 170, 
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p. 11. 
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completion set at 1983, was reported to be $17 million, of which $8 
million would be contributed by China.179 In Syria, according to 
Chinese sources, a stadium was under construction using Chinese 
aid funds. 1so In Iraq the minutes of talks on the construction of a 
bridge were signed, presumably as part of a Chinese aid 
agreement. 181 Peking also publicized the completion of a woolen 
washing and spinning mill in Iraq, built in part by Chinese aid. 182 
In Kuwait a Chinese medical team was replaced by a new team, 
and in Algeria Chinese medical workers were active and were 
even reported to have rendered treatment to former Prime 
Minister Boumedienne.183 China also provided relief aid in the 
form of blankets and canned food to help displaced persons in 
southern Lebanon. 184 Finally, China provided assistance to the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, in the form of medicine and 
supplies delivered through its ambassador in Syria.185 
In Latin American and non-communist Europe, China 
purveyed aid to three countries in 1978: Guyana, Jamaica and 
Malta. Chile was the recipient of a sizeable aid donation in 1977 
and may have drawn on these credits, although the fact that 
China recently discovered a large copper field at home may have 
taken away its incentive to grant economic assistance to Chile. In 
the past Chinese economic aid to Chile was clearly aimed at 
maintaining a guaranteed source of copper imports.186 In any 
event, there were no reports from either side on the use of Chinese 
aid. Aid to Guyana consisted of continued help in building a 
179. Ibid. According to the original negotiations the canal was to cost $15.7 
million. The difference may be explained by more detailed estimates or changes in 
values of the currencies involved. The 1978 figure is translated from Tunisian 
dinars. 
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9, 1978, p. A10. 
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textile company, a carryover of past aid work. 1H: No new aid was 
reported. China's continuing interest in Guyana, albeit small, 
relates to that country's socialist government and Peking's desire 
to support a left-wing government in Latin America as an 
alt2rnative to Cuba. Peking's aid people also helped maintain 
contacts with the government while eschewing ties with the 
Guyana Communist Party, which is strong but clearly pro-Soviet. 
Jamaica became a recipient of Chinese largess for the first 
time in 1978. In September an agreement was signed whereby 
Peking agreed to supply the equipment and materials for building 
the ... Tamaican Cotton-Polyester Textile Company.i'8 No details, 
however, were provided on the value of this project or the 
conditions attached to the loan or grant. In December China 
signed another agreement with the Jamaican government, this 
time in the form of a $1.6 million commodity loan without 
interest. 1 ~'9 China's interest in Jamaica ostensibly related to that 
country's relations with other countries in the area, especially 
Cuba, and to Soviet efforts to gain influence there. 
Chinese economic aid to Malta, attractive for its strategic 
location though of uncertain advantage to China, continued in the 
form of earlier aid promises being drawn. China's official news 
service in July announced that Chinese technicians were 
continuing their stay in Malta, working on a large dry dock 
capable of repairing 300,000-ton ships. 190 Subsequently it was 
announced that China had purchased its second oil tanker from 
Malta, the 5,700-ton Da Ching-217.191 A continued presence in 
Malta is apparently deemed useful by Chinese leaders in view of 
China's declining presence in Albania and the apprehension that 
in the near future Soviet aid personnel and military advisors may 
be sent to Albania, though there was no indication in 1978 that 
this might happen. 
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VI. Conclusions 
In some ways, China's foreign aid program in 1978 seemed to 
be at a turning point. In other ways Peking's aid giving confirmed 
past trends and long-standing foreign policy goals. In regard to 
new directions, China seemed to be abandoning the practice of 
supporting client states with large amounts of economic assist-
ance as confirmed by its rejection of any new large project. 
China's new leaders also questioned both the wisdom and the 
usefulness of providing costly economic support for Vietnam and 
Albania in the context of China's need for foreign exchange to 
further its own development programs. Looking at the situation 
another way, China would have had to make a decision to 
compete with the Soviet Union in aiding Vietnam, ultimately 
making Vietnam more industrialized and more prosperous than 
China itself. Regarding China's aid to Albania, China's new 
leadership simply perceived Albania as less useful (in the context 
of China's new pragmatism) and troublesome. 
Kampuchea and Pakistan may be categorized as exceptions to 
China's view of supporting client states, although the latter would 
hardly fit this defmition in terms of its dependence on China 
economically or China's influence there. And in the case of 
Kampuchea, Vietnam's defeat of the Pol Pot regime eliminated 
Kampuchea as China's ally and protege in Southeast Asia. In 
view of the Pol Pot regime's human rights record, China may 
have been glad that he fell and may have withheld aid late in the 
year, making that eventuality more probable. Clearly China's ties 
with that government were an embarrassment in the context of 
Peking's efforts to improve its relations with the United States. 
On the other hand, China seemed to be preparing for a long fight 
and appeared to be committed to supporting a guerrilla movement 
against the new Vietnam-supported government in Kampuchea. 
In this connection China's invasion of Vietnam early in 1979 may 
be seen, at least in terms of the results expected, as costly 
economically for Vietnam. China destroyed much of Vietnam's 
economic infrastructure in the north as well as aid projects that 
China financed and helped build. Ironically, China may be seen 
as having taken away some of its aid. Vietnam is certainly 
expected to experience economic problems as a result of the cutoff 
of Chinese aid, the cost of rebuilding after the Chinese invasion 
and, not heretofore mentioned, the loss of Chinese oil shipments. 
It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union will supplant 
Chinese aid and oil. Similarly the future form of China's relations 
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with Kampuchea is uncertain. Peking probably hopes to support a 
new leader of the . guerrilla movement in negotiations on 
Kampuchea's future leading to the exit of the Vietnam-supported 
Samrin government, and the installation of a neutral government. 
China will probably continue to aid Pakistan as long as it 
serves as a counterweight to Indian and Soviet influence on the 
subcontinent. Clearly Chinese leaders do not expect Pakistan to 
become dependent upon China's aid or to institute socialism 
because of its friendly ties with China and Chinese economic help. 
On the other hand China's economic assistance has been helpful, 
particularly in 1978 with the cutoff of U.S. aid. In addition, 
China's commitment to Pakistan,fdemonstrated by its aid, 
probably helped the Pakistan government maintain its hard-line 
stance toward the Soviet Union and India at a time of external 
pressure and internal instability. 
In Africa China appears to be as committed as ever to Mrican 
nations. But this now has new meaning. Peking seems less 
concerned about a base of operations and permanent friends, or 
allies. Rather it is looking at the region from a broader 
perspective: as part of the Third World, as a large number of votes 
in the U.N., and as an area where China can compete with the 
Soviet Union. Clearly, at least judging from China's aid program 
to African nations in 1978, Peking is no longer competing with the 
West. 
The Middle East remains a promising area to China: 
geopolitically important and crucial to the Soviet Union and the 
West due to the oil resources. This presents special opportunities, · 
though China's role in foreign aid giving has diminished in the 
context of billions of dollars in oil money in the Middle East -
more than can be invested efficiently. Peking apparently still sees 
its lies with the Muslim world as useful in checking the spread of 
Soviet influence, and good relations with Middle Eastern 
countries as important in terms of Peking's goals in South and 
Southeast Asia and to a lesser extent Mrica. Elsewhere, namely 
in Latin America, China does not seem confident enough or does 
not perceive interests which justify expanding either its foreign 
aid program or its foreign policy interests. 
Considering all regions, China in 1978 seemed to be leaning 
toward a foreign aid program with more but smaller recipients -
as was true of China's aid program when it was initiated in the 
1950s. Peking seemed to seek more publicity for its aid program 
trying to make it more a showcase to support Peking's bid for 
leadership of the Third World, rather than a tool of foreign policy 
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to be used to combat imperialism. On the other hand, the anti-
Soviet aspect of China's foreign aid diplomacy remained. 
China's foreign aid program in 1978 gave additional confir-
mation to China's improved relations with the United States and 
its efforts to become a more legitimate member of the interna-
tional community. Nowhere was China's foreign aid competitive 
with U.S. aid. Likewise China voiced no criticism of U.S. economic 
aid. In fact, Peking seemed to structure its foreign aid giving upon 
the premise that it did not want to compete with U.S. or Western 
aid, and instead, where possible, it appeared to prefer allowing 
U.S. aid efforts to play a leading role in impeding efforts by the 
·Soviets Union to extend Soviet influence in Third World countries. 
Chinese aid in this sense became complementary to Western aid, 
or at least seemed to be going in this direction. 
This probably also goes far in explaining China's declining 
enthusiasm for supporting "wars of national liberation" and its 
meager military assistance. Peking apparently now views its 
relations with the U.S. and other Western countries as more 
important than its erstwhile goal of supporting anti-imperialist 
revolutionary movements. In this context Chinese leaders have 
learned that granting military aid will evoke large Soviet grants 
or sales of weapons to an opposing nation, or faction in the case of 
civil wars, and that if the U.S. is unwilling to extend military aid 
to stop Soviet penetration or influence, there is little China can do 
that would not be counterproductive. 
Similarly China's aid program in no way exhibited any 
competition· with Japanese or Arab economic aid. In fact, China 
seemed to be indifferent to the fact that both were giving large 
amounts of aid to nations that China aided in the past and 
continued to aid. This again suggests that uppermost in the minds 
of Chinese leaders in terms of motivating Chinese foreign aid, was 
blocking the spread of Soviet penetration of Third World countries 
and Moscow's efforts to surround China with its naval power. 
China's stance toward U.N. development programs and the 
fact that China for the first time actively sought U.N. aid and 
cooperation with U.N. programs of a development nature, suggest 
that China may seek U.N. help for its own development. Yet, 
China still wants to be a model for Third World nations and seeks 
to attain some influence with Third World countries in the 
development realm through bilateral aid. It is uncertain at this 
time how China will deal with this apparent contradiction. 
The broadening of its foreign aid program in 1978 to include 
new nations and a slightly increased number of aid projects (if 
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Vietnam and Albania are not considered) suggests that China 
still views its foreign aid program as a useful and an important 
instrument of its foreign policy. Moreover, judging from its aid 
activities in 1978, Peking still seeks to maintain a bigger presence 
overseas and finds its aid people good representatives. This, 
however, should be juxtaposed beside China's rather cautious 
approach to foreign aid giving during the year. Chinese leaders, 
especially Teng Hsiao-p'ing, seemed to be reappraising China's 
foreign aid program, especially its costs, in the context of China's 
needs for investment funds at home. 
It should be expected that China will continue to support a 
foreign aid program in the future and that foreign economic 
assistance will continue 
In conclusion it should be expected that China will continue to 
support a fairly large foreign aid program in the future and that 
foreign economic assistance will continue to play a role in the 
conduct of Chinese diplomacy. Chinese aid will doubtless continue 
to have a special impact in special situations and it will give 
China a reputation for its support of the Third World, to offset its 
small amount of trade with Third World countries. And, it will 
remain a conscience of the rich nations and the Soviet Union, 
since China is a poor nation with an extensive foreign aid 
program. On the other hand, it remains to be seen what effect 
publiciopinion in China will have on foreign aid giving. Economic 
growth at home remains a top priority and it has mass support. 
Thus as Chinese populace comes to realize that most of the 
countries that China is giving foreign aid to are richer and are 
developing as fast or faster than China, there may be some 
resistance to continuing a foreign aid program. This certainly 
reflects complaints in the early part of the year about China's aid 
to Vietnam and Albania. 
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